We analyze price discovery in floor-based and electronic exchanges using data from the German stock market. We find that both markets contribute to price discovery. There is bidirectional Granger causality, and prices from both markets adjust to deviations from the long-run equilibrium. We use two different measures of the contributions to price discovery, the information share (Hasbrouck 1995) and the weights with which the series enter the common long memory component as defined by Gonzalo / Granger (1995) . The contributions of the two trading systems to the process of price discovery are almost equal when transaction prices are used for the estimation. Models based on quote midpoints indicate that the electronic trading system has a larger share in the price discovery process. A cross-sectional analysis reveals that the contributions to price discovery are positively related to the market shares of the trading systems. 
Introduction
In recent years electronic trading systems proliferated in the world's financial markets. Screen trading systems are said to have a variety of specific advantages. They offer lower operating costs, remote access to the system and higher transparency (see, e.g., Domowitz / Steil 1998).
It has even been argued that the survival of floor trading systems may be attributable to vested interests rather than to specific advantages offered by these trading systems (Domowitz 1993) .
Although these arguments may seem convincing, empirical evidence on the relative advantages of floor and electronic trading systems is certainly needed before far-reaching policy implications are to be given. The objective of the present paper is to contribute to this evidence. We focus on the aspect of price discovery which is central to the operation of a financial market. Our research design makes use of a distinguishing feature of the German stock market, namely, the co-existence of two liquid markets for the same stocks.
1 Since 1991, a fully electronic trading system (IBIS, in November 1997 replaced by XETRA)
operates parallel to the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. This allows us to directly compare the price discovery process in floor and screen trading systems.
The present paper is related to previous work on price discovery in floor and electronic trading systems. Both Grünbichler / Longstaff / Schwartz (1994) and Stucki / Wasserfallen (1994) compare a floor-based stock market to an electronic derivatives exchange. Grünbichler / Longstaff / Schwartz (1994) find that the screen-traded future leads the stock market whereas Stucki / Wasserfallen (1994) report that screen-traded equity options lag the stock market. The
Bund futures contract, traded on the floor of the LIFFE and in the electronic DTB (now 1
In fact, there are nine rather than two markets because seven regional exchanges exist besides the Frankfurt Stock Exchange and the electronic trading system. Given their low market shares, we do not consider the regional exchanges in this paper. See Kehr (1997) , Kirchner (1999) and Schmidt / Iversen / Treske (1993) for a treatment of this issue.
EUREX), has been analyzed in several papers (Breedon / Holland 1998 , Fraser-Jenkins 1998 , Kofman / Moser 1997 , Martens 1998 , Shyy / Lee 1995 . Although the conclusions reached in these papers differ (partly due to different sample periods), the balance of the results indicates that the electronic market leads the floor. It should be noted, however, that the electronic market is the home market. Therefore, it may be the price-leader for reasons other than the trading mechanism.
The German stock market with its unique feature of parallel floor and screen trading has also been subject to empirical investigation. Kirchner / Schlag (1998) document that the prices in the electronic trading system adjust to the price established in the opening auction on the floor. Both Freihube / Theissen (2001) and Kempf / Korn (1998) compare the two markets using stock index data. Kempf / Korn (1998) find that the integration between the electronic trading system and the (equally electronic) futures market is higher than the degree of integration between the floor and the futures market. Freihube / Theissen (2001) document that the screen-based XETRA system contributes more to the price discovery process than the floor for the blue-chip index DAX. The reverse is true, however, for the mid-cap index MDAX.
Stock-level analyses are provided by Bühler / Grünbichler / Schmidt (1995) , Kehr (1997) and Kirchner (1999) . The results do not support the hypothesis that one of the markets is the leader in the price discovery process. These papers are closely related to ours. There is, however, an important difference. All three papers use transactions data. 2 This entails the problem of restructuring the data in a way that is consistent with the implicit assumption of synchronicity. A second problem lies in the fact that the number of observations is rather low 2 Data on bid and ask quotes is not available on a regular basis for the German stock market.
for less liquid stocks. Consequently, both Bühler / Grünbichler / Schmidt (1995) and Kirchner (1999) restrict their analysis to a small number of liquid stocks (four and eight, respectively).
In the present paper we use data on both transaction prices and bid and ask quotes. This allows us to construct an equally-spaced and (almost 3 ) synchronous data set. Further, since quote changes are more frequent than transactions, we are able to include a larger number of stocks than some of the previous studies. This allows us to analyze the cross-sectional determinants of the relative contributions of the two markets to the process of price discovery.
We quantify the contributions of the two markets to the process of price discovery using two different approaches. The first consists in estimating the information shares of the two markets as proposed by Hasbrouck (1995) . Our second approach builds on work by Schwarz / Szakmary (1994) and Gonzalo / Granger (1995) . Schwarz / Szakmary (1994) propose a simple measure of the contributions to price discovery that can be obtained directly from the estimated coefficients of the error correction model. We give a formal justification for this measure. Gonzalo / Granger (1995) document how the common long memory components can be identified from a system of cointegrated variables. We show that the weights with which the time series enter the common long memory component are equal to the contributions to price discovery as defined by Schwarz / Szakmary (1994) .
The main findings can be summarized as follows. Both markets contribute to price discovery.
There is bidirectional Granger causality, and prices from both markets adjust to deviations from the long-run equilibrium. We apply both measures of the contributions to price discovery and find that they are very similar and highly correlated. Our results thus support the application of the simpler measure.
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As will be pointed out in detail below, there are instances when no valid quotes exist on the floor. In these cases we use the last available quote midpoint.
The contributions of the two competing trading systems to the process of price discovery are almost equal when transaction prices are used for the estimation. Models based on quote midpoints, on the other hand, indicate that the electronic trading system has a larger share in the price discovery process. An additional cross-sectional analysis reveals that the contributions of the two trading systems to price discovery are positively related to their market shares.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews theoretical arguments in favor of better price discovery in floor or screen-based trading systems. Section 3 offers a brief description of the microstructure of the German stock market and describes our data set.
In section 4 we describe our methodology. Section 5 documents the results of the error correction models. Section 6 concludes.
Theory
Floor and electronic trading systems differ with respect to a number of characteristics which are related to the speed of price discovery. Screen trading systems are less costly to operate and may, therefore, offer lower bid-ask spreads. The possibility of remote access may increase the number of traders and thereby also lead to an increase in liquidity. The magnitude of the transaction costs determines whether a trader can profitably trade on a given piece of information. Therefore, price discovery should be faster in screen-based trading systems.
Three further arguments corroborate this prediction. Orders can be entered faster into an electronic system and the execution of an order is immediate. Further, it is easier to disseminate market information, thereby increasing the transparency of the market and the information available to the traders. Greater pre-trade transparency allows to more accurately estimate the price impact of a trade. Finally, the anonymity of most existing electronic trading systems makes it easier for informed traders to exploit their informational advantage.
Therefore, the screen trading system is likely to attract informed traders.
These arguments yield the prediction that the electronic trading system impounds new information faster into prices. When interpreting this, one important point should be noted.
The arguments implying faster price discovery in screen-based trading systems are partly based on the presumption that it is easier for informed traders to exploit their informational advantage. This clearly imposes adverse selection costs on other traders. It is a priori unclear whether these costs overcompensate the advantages offered by electronic trading systems.
Theissen (2001), also using data from the German stock market, finds that the adverse selection component of the spread is higher in the electronic trading system than on the floor.
In spite of this, effective spreads are lower for liquid stocks but are higher for less liquid stocks than effective spreads on the floor. This suggests that the higher adverse selection costs overcompensate the advantages of screen-based trading systems for less liquid stocks whereas the advantages outweigh the costs for the more liquid stocks.
It should thus be kept in mind that faster price discovery does not necessarily imply higher overall market quality. Resolving the issue addressed here -the trade-off between informational efficiency and liquidity -is, however, beyond the scope of the present paper. The description documents the organization of trading during the sample period.
Market structure and data
orders in the limit order book. He is allowed but, unlike the NYSE specialist, not obliged to trade for his own account. Orders are either routed electronically into the book or are communicated verbally on the floor. Based on the orders in the book and his willingness to trade as principal, the Makler announces bid and ask prices. These are entered into an electronic system and are called Pretrades. Although no quoted depth is publicly announced, the depth at the quotes appears to be reasonably high. This is evidenced by two observations.
First, transactions at prices outside the quoted spread rarely occur. They account for only 0.9% of the transactions in our data set. Second, the average transaction size on the floor is larger than the average transaction size in the electronic trading system for all but one of the sample stocks.
The Pretrades are deleted automatically from the system after each transaction. This has two important implications for our empirical analysis. First, valid quotes do not always exist because it takes some time to re-enter quotes after a transaction. Second, since quotes have to be re-entered after each transaction, they are unlikely to become stale. Further, the incentive to quote a wide spread in order to avoid frequent re-posting is reduced -quotes have to be reentered anyway.
As is the case on the NYSE, transactions may, and often do, occur at prices inside the spread.
Approximately 40% of the transactions in our data set benefit from price improvement, 20%
occur at a price that equals the quote midpoint.
IBIS, in operation from April 1991 to November 1997, was an anonymous, fully electronic open limit order book. The best bids and offers, together with the quantity bid or offered, were displayed on the trading screens. In order to trigger a transaction a trader had to explicitly accept a limit order displayed on the screen. This feature characterizes IBIS as a "hit-andtake" system. There were no designated market makers in IBIS. There has, however, been a DM 100) and is equal in both trading systems. We therefore do not consider price discreteness to be an important issue.
Our data set contains time-stamped transaction prices, trading volumes and best bid and best ask quotes from both trading systems. This data was provided by Deutsche Börse AG for the 30 stocks which comprise the index DAX. The sample covers 42 trading days in the months June and July 1997.
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Insert Table 1 about here   Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the sample stocks. The average trading volume in the three hours of parallel trading ranges from DM 132.8 million to DM 9.1 million. Similarly, the average daily number of transactions ranges from 335 to 36. The average effective spread ranges from 0.084% to 0.407% on the floor and from 0.095% to 0.544% in IBIS.
The market shares of the two trading systems in terms of trading volume are almost equal (unweighted average of the IBIS market share 51.6%). There is, however, a tendency for the market share of IBIS to be higher for more liquid stocks. If market share is measured in terms of the number of transactions, the market share of the electronic trading system is higher (unweighted average 62.9%). This indicates that the average transaction size is slightly larger on the floor. Finally, there is a tendency for effective spreads to be lower in IBIS for the most liquid stocks but to be lower on the floor for the less liquid stocks.
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Methodology
Error correction model
If price discovery is faster in one market, returns on this market should lead the returns on the other market. A convenient method to test for such a lead-lag relationship is to estimate the VAR model
where r denotes log returns, t indexes time and f and s characterize returns from the floor and the screen trading system, respectively. When the coefficients Granger causality. Hasbrouck (1995) points out that the VAR specification is inappropriate when the prices in the two markets are cointegrated. In this case, the representation theorem (Engle / Granger 5 Two of the 44 trading days in the sample months (July 21 st and July 23 rd ) had to be discarded. On both days, the exchange's computer facilities broke down and trading had to be suspended several times.
1987) posits that the model has to be augmented with an error correction term. This results in the error correction model ( ) ( )
where p denotes the log price. Generally, the cointegrating relation describes the long-run equilibrium of the system. In the present case, the two time series under scrutiny are two prices for the same stock established in two parallel markets. In equilibrium, the prices should be equal. The resulting long-run equilibrium is given by 0 An important aspect of the analysis is to quantify the contribution of the two markets to the process of price discovery. Two methods, one due to Hasbrouck (1995) and one due to Schwarz / Szakmary (1994) , have been proposed. We will discuss both measures briefly.
Information Shares (Hasbrouck 1995) The information share relates the contribution of an individual market's innovation to the total innovation of the common efficient price. The latter is identified as the common trend in the common trend representation of the model (Stock / Watson 1988) . If the markets' innovations were uncorrelated (i.e., if the variance-covariance matrix Ω were diagonal), the information share of market j would be given by
where c is the common row vector of the impact matrix in the common trend representation.
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In practice, the innovations will be correlated. 8 Hasbrouck (1995) proposed to triangularize the variance-covariance matrix. A Cholesky factorization is used to obtain the lower triangular
. The definition of market j's information share then becomes
Due to the nature of the Cholesky decomposition this procedure maximizes the information share of the first market and, consequently, minimizes the share of the second market. By permuting the order of the markets, upper and lower bounds for each market's information share are obtained. Following the literature, we use the mean of the upper and the lower bound as a unique measure of a market's information share. Martens (1998) shows that, in the case of two markets with a cointegrating vector (1; -1), the information shares for markets 1 and 2 are given by 
; ' δ δ = % % % is a vector orthogonal to the vector ( )
; ' δ δ = of the coefficients on the error correction term. This vector is defined (up to multiplication with a constant x) by
where x is an arbitrary constant. The information shares are then given by 
where ( )
Common factor weights
The coefficients 
If price discovery occurs in IBIS only, 0 θ = ; if price discovery occurs exclusively on the floor, 1 θ = . If both trading systems contribute equally to the process of price discovery,
The measure has, as it appears, been developed on intuitive grounds. However, a formal justification can be derived from the work of Gonzalo / Granger (1995) . The common trend representation of the system can be written as
where t P is the vector of log prices,
where β is the cointegrating vector, t f is the common long-memory component and t P % is an I(0) component. Gonzalo / Granger (1995) impose two restrictions that allow to identify the common long-memory component t f : 10 1. t f is a linear combination of the series P t and 2. t f and t P % form a permanent-transitory decomposition of P t where the specific definition of the decomposition is given by Gonzalo / Granger (1995, p. 28 ).
The long-memory component is then defined up to multiplication with a constant by
where % is defined as before, i.e., is a vector orthogonal to δ. From this it follows that the weights with which the series enter the common long-memory component are defined by the elements of % . The relative weight of market one is, from (6) With the information share and the common factor weights we have two alternative measures of a market's contribution to price discovery. One important objective of our paper is to compare these measures.
Estimation procedure
Transactions do not occur at regular intervals, nor do transactions in the two parallel trading systems occur simultaneously. The data set thus has to be re-organized prior to estimation. We subdivided our sample into intervals of equal length and, for each interval, recorded the last available price and quote midpoint. Overnight returns were excluded from the estimation. We chose two interval lengths, one minute and five minutes. 11 Using quote midpoints in addition to transaction prices is potentially advantageous because bid and ask quotes are (almost 12 )
permanently available. Quote data thus allows to construct an (almost) simultaneous data set.
In a first step we test the order of integration of the log price series. Augmented Dickey Fuller tests reject the null hypothesis of a unit root slightly more frequently than expected. We obtain 12% rejections at the 5% level of significance. 13 For the first-differenced series the null hypothesis of a unit root was rejected in each case at the 1% level of significance.
We next tested for cointegration. We used the likelihood ratio test procedure proposed by Johansen (1988 Johansen ( , 1991 . The results indicate that the time series from the floor and IBIS are cointegrated. The order of the error correction model was determined using the Schwarz information criterion. The appropriate lag lengths lie between 1 and 4 for the 5-minute series 11 There are alternative ways to organize the data set. Harris et al. (1995) propose to construct a matched sample of transactions. This procedure has the advantage that the matching algorithm can be chosen such that the delay between the observations from the two markets is minimized. The disadvantage is that the observations are not equally spaced, rather, the sample is formed in transaction time. Given that we use quote data, we can construct an almost synchronous sample and therefore prefer the procedure described in the text. 12 As outlined above, bid and ask quotes on the floor are deleted after each transaction. Although new quotes are usually posted within a couple of seconds, there are instances where no valid quotes exist on the floor. In these cases we use the last available quote midpoint in the estimation. 13 We have eight time series for each stock: 1-minute interval and 5-minute interval series of prices and quote midpoints from the floor and IBIS. The total number of tests is thus 240.
and between 1 and 20 for the 1-minute series. As outlined above we use the pre-specified cointegrating vector [1; -1] in the estimation.
Results
We present the results in three steps. The first subsection describes the results of the error correction model. In the second subsection we compare the information shares and the common factor weights. The last subsection analyzes the cross-sectional determinants of the contributions to price discovery. Table 2 shows the results for the one-minute intervals. They clearly indicate that both markets contribute to the process of price discovery. We find bi-directional Granger causality irrespective of whether the estimation is based on transaction prices or quote midpoints. The In order to analyze whether IBIS contributes more to the process of price discovery we tested whether the average factor weight and the average information share is different from 0.5
ECM results
using both a t-test and a non-parametric Wilcoxon test. The null hypothesis of a mean (t-test)
and median (Wilcoxon test), respectively, of 0.5 is rejected at the 10% level for the common factor weights and at the 5% level for the information shares. The results are thus consistent with the hypothesis that IBIS has the leading role in the price discovery process. The differences between IBIS and the floor are, however, surprisingly small.
Insert Table 2 Consequently, the quotation activity is significantly higher and the quote midpoint changes more frequently. The market share of IBIS in terms of published quotes is 77.8% as compared to a 63.3% share in the number of transactions. Our estimation results indicate that these quote changes in IBIS convey information that is used by the Makler when he sets his own quotes.
Insert Table 3 about here   Table 3 shows the results based on the five-minute intervals. They are qualitatively similar.
We again find bi-directional Granger causality and both the common factor weights and the information shares indicate that both markets contribute to price discovery. 14 The Makler has to change the quoted prices when new limit orders are submitted that narrow the spread. However. as documented by Freihube et al. (1999) , the role of limit orders in the process of liquidity provision on the floor is limited. 15 As noted in section 4, only upper and lower bounds for the information shares can be given when the innovations in the two markets are correlated. Hasbrouck (1995) points out that the precision with which the information shares are estimated is related to the sampling frequency. The intuition is that the longer is the
The results are again more favorable for IBIS when the quote midpoint model is considered.
The average values of the factor weights and the information shares are 0.650 and 0.565, respectively, and both averages are significantly larger than 0.5 at better than the 5% level. In four out of the 30 cases the coefficient on the error correction term is not significantly different from zero in the IBIS equation. This indicates that, in these four cases, quotes on the floor adjust to deviations between the trading systems whereas quotes in IBIS do not.
Information shares versus common factor weights
The results in the preceding subsection already indicated that the common factor weights and the information shares lead to qualitatively similar conclusions. We now turn to a more detailed comparison of these two measures of price discovery.
Insert Table 4 about here Table 4 sampling interval, the higher is the probability that simultaneous price changes are observed in the two markets. This leads to higher correlation of the innovations which, in turn, translates into larger differences between the upper and the lower bound for the information share. Our results are consistent with this intuition. The differences between the upper and lower bounds are unanimously higher for the 5-minute models as compared to the 1-minute models. Further, the differences tend to be higher for more liquid stocks (note that the stocks in Table 2 and Table 3 are sorted by trading volume in descending order). More liquid stocks have higher transaction frequencies and, consequently, a given interval length is associated with higher contemporaneous correlation of the innovations. minute quote midpoints yields the lowest correlation. The correlation coefficient of 0.831 is however, still strongly significant at usual levels.
Insert Figure 1 and Figure 2 about here Figure 1 and Figure 2 visualize the results for the 1-minute models. It is apparent that the common factor weights and the information shares are very similar. Given that the factor weights are both theoretically well founded and easy to calculate, our results give strong support to the application of this simple measure.
Cross-sectional determinants of the common factor weights
Our data set allows us to address the question of what determines the contributions of the two trading systems to the process of price discovery. Since, as documented in the preceding subsection, both measures of these contributions are very similar, we restrict the analysis to the common factor weights.
The stocks in Table 2 and Table 3 In order to obtain more detailed insight into the cross-sectional determinants of the contributions to price discovery we perform a regression analysis. The dependent variable is the IBIS common factor weight (1 -θ). There are several variables that may have explanatory power for the factor weights. First, it was found in previous studies that the market with the larger market share contributes more to price discovery. 16 Therefore, we use the market share of IBIS as an explanatory variable. Second, as outlined in section 2, smaller spreads enable investors to exploit smaller pieces of information. We therefore include the difference between the effective spread on the floor and the effective spread in IBIS on the right-hand side.
Finally, the amount of informed trading may be related to the contributions to price discovery.
We use the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread as a proxy for the amount of informed trading. We estimate the adverse selection component using a two-way decomposition similar to the one proposed by Huang / Stoll (1996) . The difference between the adverse selection components is then included as an explanatory variable. To avoid multicollinearity we do not include effective spreads and adverse selection component at the same time but rather estimate two separate models. The two models are thus ( We expect that (1 -θ) is larger (i.e., the contribution of IBIS to price discovery is larger) the larger the market share of IBIS and the larger the spread on the floor relative to the spread in IBIS. We thus expect the coefficients a 1 , a 2 , b 1 and b 2 to be positive.
Insert Table 5 about here
We estimate both equations using the factor weights obtained from the 1-minute and 5-minute price and quote midpoint models. The results are presented in Table 5 . The explanatory power is higher for the models based on prices as compared to the models based on quote midpoints and is higher for the 1-minute models as compared to the 5-minute models.
The intercept is larger in the models based on quote midpoints. This is consistent with our earlier finding that the IBIS factor weights are larger when the estimation is based on quote midpoints. The coefficient on the IBIS market share has the expected sign in all eight cases. It is significant at the 5% level or better in all models based on prices but in only one of the quote midpoint models. The coefficient on the spread differential also has the expected sign. It is significant, however, only in the 1-minute transaction price model. In the 1-minute midpoint model the coefficient is significantly different from zero only at the 10% level. The coefficient on the difference in the adverse selection components always has the expected positive sign but is never significantly different from zero.
The results thus indicate that the contribution to price discovery is positively related to the market share. The relation between the relative size of the bid-ask spread and the contribution to price discovery has the expected sign but is, at best, weak.
Summary
In the present paper we exploit a unique institutional feature of the German stock market, namely, the co-existence of floor and screen trading, to analyze the price discovery in traditional floor-based and electronic exchanges.
We estimate error correction models based on transaction prices and quote midpoints. The results confirm the finding that both systems contribute to price discovery. The contributions are almost equal when the estimation is based on transaction prices. The model based on quotes midpoints, on the other hand, leads to the conclusion that the electronic trading system contributes more to price discovery. This is consistent with the higher quotation activity in
IBIS.
We analyze two different measures of the contributions to price discovery. The first is the information share proposed by Hasbrouck (1995) , the second is a simple measure calculated from the coefficients of the ECM and first proposed by Schwarz / Szakmary (1994) . We give a theoretical foundation for this measure by showing that it is equal to the weights with which the time series under scrutiny enter the common long memory component as defined by Gonzalo / Granger (1995) . We therefore term this measure the common factor weight. Our analysis reveals that the information share and the common factor weights are very similar.
Given that the common factor weights are easier to estimate, our results thus support the application of this measure.
An analysis of the cross-sectional determinants of the contributions to price discovery reveals that the contributions of the trading systems are positively related to their market shares. The relation between the relative size of the bid-ask spread and the contribution to price discovery is, at best, weak. DBK  SIE  ALV  VEB  COB  DTE  MMW  MUV  BVM  THY  SCH  MEO  LHA  DEG  HEN   P5  MQ5 
